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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a detailed overview of a publicly available infringement database 
which contains 5.800 cases for the time period 1978-1999. We first address the ques-
tion whether infringement proceedings are a reliable indicator for non-compliance in the 
European Union. In the following we present descriptive statistics on various character-

















The infringement database is accessible by a user-friendly web interface. It is also pos-
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1. Introduction  
 
Does the European Union (EU) suffer from a serious compliance problem? Early works 
on non-compliance in the EU argued that the legal transposition and effective applica-
tion of EU Law is a systemic and pathological problem of the EU (cf. Krislov et al. 1986; 
Weiler 1988; From and Stava 1993). In 1985, the European Commission warned that 
political and legislative efforts to create the internal market “will be in vain if the correct 
application of the agreed rules is not ensured.”1
 
 
Current transposition rates for internal market policies reach 99 per cent which could 
indicate that the alleged compliance deficit is a problem of the past.2
 
 But these trans-
position rates only describe the amount of notifications send to the Commission by the 
member states; incorrect legal transpositions and missing practical applications are not 
included. Without reliable data, it is impossible to assess the degree of non-compliance 
in the EU. 
This paper discusses the various indicators for non-compliance developed by the litera-
ture to quantify non-compliance in the EU. We explore their strengths and weaknesses 
and compare them to data on infringement proceedings we compiled for the project 
“Non-compliance with law beyond the nation-state”, funded by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) 2002-2006.3 With the help of a JMCE grant4
 
, we made 
the infringement database accessible by a user-friendly web interface. It is also possi-
ble to download the raw data (http://www.infringement-db.jmce.org/Index.html). Fund-
ing by both the DFG and the European Union is gratefully acknowledged. 
                                               
 
1  Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council COM(85) 
310, June 1985. 
2  Internal Market Scoreboard 25, European Union, 2012. 
3  BO 1831/1-1. 
4  Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence: Project No. 2009-2856. 
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2. Infringement data – reliable non-compliance measure? 
 
Since more than a decade, research on (non-) compliance with EU law has been one 
of the most productive, diverse, and controversial subfields in European Union studies. 
A wide variety of qualitative and quantitative research designs has been deployed to 
analyze and better understand the transposition and implementation of EU law.  
 
Scholars using qualitative methods have relied on case studies to analyze cross-
country and within country variation in the legal transposition, practical application, and 
enforcement of national transposition measures of EU directives as well as European 
regulations, decisions, and treaty provisions. The project by Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, 
and Leiber (2005) studied no less than 90 country-directive cases. Most case studies, 
however, have focused on only a small number of selected member states and Euro-
pean legal acts. These studies certainly have the advantage of providing detailed and 
in-depth insights into the costs of compliance, the enforcement activities by the Euro-
pean Commission, the case-specific administrative capacity of member states, prefer-
ences of domestic actors, or other causes of (non-) compliance with EU law. However, 
they also pay a price for this advantage. Developing their own assessment criteria and 
collecting the empirical information in laborious case studies renders the comparison of 
empirical findings and theoretical claims difficult (Toshkov et al. 2010). Others, there-
fore, have drawn on statistical data provided by the European Commission as the en-
forcement agent of the EU. 
 
Quantitative compliance studies fall into one of two camps – one studying the (correct 
and) timely transposition of EU directives in the member states, the other working with 
infringement proceedings that the European Commission launches against member 
states for violations of EU law (cf. Toshkov 2010). While these studies might generate 
results of higher generalizability and external validity, they have their own shortcomings 
and methodological obstacles.  
 
Since 1990, the Commission reports the Directives implemented by the member states 
as percentage of the Directives to be implemented (Börzel 2001: 815). The data is reli-
able. Yet, timely transposition is only one form of non-compliance with EU law, and 
arguably not the most relevant one. Not only has average transposition always been 
high (above 90%). It has improved over the years, from an average of 91% in 1990 to 
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an average of 95% in 1999. Moreover, the notification of national transposition 
measures is not the same as the “correct‟ and “timely‟ implementation of EU directives 
(cf. König and Luetgert 2009). While the notification of transposition might be an ac-
ceptable proxy for the timeliness of some kind of national implementation measures, 
there is no guarantee that these measures constitute a correct transposition of EU law. 
Therefore, researchers are left with a choice between two evils. They can either as-
sume that member states correctly transpose and implement EU directives or have to 
develop some subjective standard that allows them to tell a member state’s compliance 
with a particular EU directive when they see it (cf. Duina 1997; Knill 1998). Of course, 
any such standard is open to criticism as it is hardly applicable to all cases at all times 
(cf. Toshkov 2010). Since member states have substantial discretion when implement-
ing directives with respect to their choice of transposition instruments, it is hard to dis-
tinguish correct vs. incorrect implementation. In addition, transposition data relies ex-
clusively on the notifications of implementation measures by member states, which 
have strong incentives to “sugarcoat” their implementation efforts – not least to avoid 
the European Commission opening infringement proceedings against them. In fact, 
there is extensive anecdotal and systematic evidence that member states transpose 
the letter of the law, but fail to adhere to its spirit.5
 
 While legal implementation may be 
timely and formally correct, transposing member states are often unwilling or unable to 
apply and enforce national transposition measures. This is not just a problem for the 
legal rights and protection of the average European citizen and the larger European 
integration project. Such compliance shortcomings fly under the radar of transpositions 
studies. Consequently, the “sequel of correct application” of the national measures 
transposing EU directives is one of the under-researched areas in EU compliance stud-
ies (Mastenbroek 2005; Treib 2008). 
Furthermore, infringement proceedings opened by the European Commission for the 
non-notification of formal transposition make up only 57% of all infringement proceed-
ings in the time period 1978-1999. Studies that rely exclusively on notification data 
miss a large proportion of non-compliance cases that get detected by the European 
Commission´s own initiative and by complaints of third parties. This might affect the 
                                               
 
5  In our data set alone, there are nearly 800 infringement cases, which reached at least the Reasoned 
Opinion stage, that were opened due to the incorrect application of national measures, i.e., due to 
member states formally transposing EU directives on time, but failing to implement and enforce them 
subsequently on the ground. 
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conclusions these studies draw about the explanations of variation in compliance with 
EU laws. Finally, there is evidence that these explanations differ with regard to the dif-
ferent types of EU legislation (Börzel 2001; Mbaye 2001). For instance, Scott Siegel 
(2011) points out how analyzing only directives might lead to conclusions that underes-
timate the role of economic adjustment costs, legitimacy, or special interests since na-
tional parliaments and bureaucracies can bypass domestic opposition in the transposi-
tion process, but not when it comes to the application and enforcement of EU direc-
tives. Regulations do not require transposition but have immediate effect. Their number 
by far exceeds that of directives (cf. König 2006).  
 
Studies relying on infringement proceedings “outsource‟ the identification of violations 
of EU law. They either rely on the European Commission’s assessment or, following a 
strictly legalistic definition of compliance, considers member states’ actions to be in line 
with EU law unless (and only unless) the European Court of Justice declares them to 
be in breach of EU law (cf. Toshkov 2010). While this way of measuring non-
compliance helps scholars to steer clear of the problems that they face when using 
transposition data, it comes with its own problems and pitfalls. There are reasons to 
question whether infringement proceedings qualify as a valid and reliable indicator of 




There is no question that infringement proceedings present only a fraction of all in-
stances of non-compliance. For reasons of limited resources, the European Commis-
sion can only prosecute cases that constitute the tip of the non-compliance iceberg 
(Falkner et al. 2005). It is not capable of detecting and legally pursuing all instances of 
non-compliance with EU law. While this might be unfortunate, the real concern is a 
potential bias in the data against particular member states. If infringement data did not 
constitutes a “random sample” of all instances of non-compliance, such a bias in the 
data would also bias the findings on the causes of non-compliance. Therefore, the 
question that researchers that make use of the European Commission’s infringement 
data need to address is whether or not these data are a fair representation of the uni-
verse of non-compliance cases in the EU.  
 
                                               
 
6  For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Börzel (2001). 
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While it might not be possible to answer this question by statistical means, we can ad-
vance at least three arguments for why infringement data do not contain a systematic 
selection bias. First, the European Commission tends to perceive itself as “the guardian 
of the Treaties” and has a clear legal mandate to enforce the correct and timely trans-
position, implementation, and application of EU law. If it was systematically biased in its 
selection of infringement cases, it would not only undermine its self-conception, but its 
legal mandate and its legitimacy. In other words, there are two mechanisms at work 
that prevent the European Commission from abusing its discretion. Commission offi-
cials follow a powerful organizational “logic of appropriateness” (March 1998) and they 
are aware of the fact that the European Commission’s authority as the guardian of the 
Treaties depends in large parts on its credibility as an impartial adjudicator between 
competing interests. It has to avoid giving the impression of treating member states in 
an unequal and unfair fashion. Second, the unequivocal formulation of Article 258 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex Article 226)7 and the Com-
mission’s role as the guardian of the Treaties mandate the Commission to enforce EU 
law and to prosecute any infringements it detects (Albin 1999: 290). This legal obliga-
tion alone might not prevent Commission officials from favoring their own country, but 
Morten Egeberg (2001) and others have argued that the European Commission’s iden-
tity as a supranational body makes it sufficiently inappropriate for Commission officials 
to block legal action against their own member state when it stands accused of violat-
ing EU law to avoid any systematic bias. Also, even if individual Commission officials 
had incentives to favor their own country, decisions to open and escalate infringement 
proceedings (i.e., to send Reasoned Opinions to member states that have failed to 
fulfill their obligations or to refer infringement cases to the ECJ) are made under the 
principle of collegiality. That is, “the decision to bring an action for a declaration of fail-
ure to fulfill obligations must be the subject of collective deliberation by the college of 
Commissioners and the information on which those decisions are based must therefore 
be available to the members of the college”.8
 
 
There are strong safeguards in place against any systematic “prosecution bias” by the 
European Commission. As it is bound to prosecute and the decision to start a proceed-
                                               
 
7  “If […] a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaties, [the European Commission] 
shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to 
submit its observations.” (emphasis added). 
8  Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 26 January 1999. Commission of the European 
Communities v Federal Republic of Germany (Case C-198/97). 
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ing involves Commission officials from all countries, it is highly unlikely that the Euro-
pean Commission could treat some member states systematically different than others. 
However, there could be systematic “detection bias”, i.e., the European Commission 
might be prosecuting all infringements on EU law it detects, but systematically investi-
gate and detect more infringements by some member states than others – independent 
of their true compliance records. Tanja Börzel (2002) has previously argued that the 
European Commission lacks capacity and that this lack of capacity prevents it from 
detecting more breaches of EU law. While Commission officials have a lot of expertise 
on EU law and potential problems with its implementation, they can only do so many 
on-site visits in the member states, and spot-checks tend to be time-consuming, politi-
cally fraught, and can easily be blocked by member states. Given the limited enforce-
ment capabilities of the European Commission and the huge task of monitoring the 
implementation of every piece of European legislation in all member states, one can 
easily envision the European Commission not only to be overstrained, but strategic and 
selective in its investigation efforts.  
 
While this is a valid point, it leads us to our second arguments for why infringement 
data do not contain a systematic selection bias. Simply put, the detection of non-
compliance does not rely exclusively on the European Commission (see Figure 1). In-
stead, there is a sophisticated and parsimonious system in place, which combines 
mandatory notification of transposition, i.e., member states reporting back on their im-
plementation activities, consultancy reports, whistle-blowing by national administra-
tions, complaints lodged by European citizens, organized interests (e.g., trade unions 
and environmentalist non-governmental organizations), and companies, as well as peti-
tions and questions by the European Parliament. This procedure that combines formal 
and informal aspects is not only more cost-efficient than systematic inquires by the 
European Commission itself, but makes it possible to spot instances of incorrect im-
plementation and application that might have otherwise gone undetected. Furthermore, 
Jonas Tallberg (2002) even argues that this procedure provides the European Com-
mission with information about areas of EU legislation that are particularly ambiguous 
and require clarification in order to prevent unintended and accidental violations of EU 
law.  
 
Even if the European Commission was biased in its own investigations, these are only 
responsible for a fraction of all detected and prosecuted violations of EU law. The com-
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plaint mechanism has developed into the “chief source for detecting infringements”9
 
, 
and is not clear why whistle-blowers, individuals, organized interests, or companies 
should be systematically biased in favor or against detecting and reporting (presumed) 
legal or actual non-compliance of some EU member states (Hartlapp 2005). Together 
with the non-notification of transposition measures, complaints by third party actors far 
outweigh the European Commission’s own investigations as sources for the detection 
of non-compliance and initiation of infringement proceedings. 
 
Figure 1: Origins of infringement proceedings 1995-2009 
 
 
Third and finally, the findings of an expert survey of legal experts confirm that infringe-
ment data do not contain a systematic selection bias. We conducted this survey asking 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives experts of the EU 15 member states 
how they assess the level of compliance of their own country vis-à-vis other EU coun-
tries, which member state they perceive as performing best and worst, and whether 
they think that the European Commission’s infringement data are biased toward certain 
member states (Börzel et al. 2010). In essence, the survey analyzes the extent to 
                                               
 
9  20th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law, COM(2003) 669 final. Brussels. 
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which the infringement data collected by the European Commission reflect the member 
states perspective and assess whether and where national experts perceive a bias in 
the data. All but one Committee of Permanent Representatives experts replied, giving 
us a response rate of 93.3%. The most important findings are that more than two thirds 
of the respondents do not think that the infringement data contain any systematic bias 
toward certain member states. What is more, the experts’ assessment of which mem-
ber states violate EU law most and least is in line with the commission’s infringement 
data, with France, Greece, and Italy being considered the main laggards and Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden the compliance leaders.  
 
Overall, there is no indication that the European Commission’s infringement data con-
tain a systematic bias due the European Commission being selective in its efforts to 
detect and/or prosecute violations of European treaty provisions, regulations, direc-
tives, and decisions. For the quantitative study of infringement proceedings against EU 
member states, it is not relevant how successful the European Commission is at moni-
toring the application of EU law. While we have no way of knowing how large the non-
compliance iceberg really is, infringement data provide us with a means to explore 
whether and why some EU laws are better applied than others and why some member 
states comply better than others. 
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3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Having discussed the caveats of using infringement data as a proxy of non-compliance 
in the EU, we now provide a detailed description of our data set. After a brief overview 
of the history of our infringement data set, we take a look at some of the major charac-
teristics of the more than 5.800 official infringement cases for the time period 1978-
1999. In particular, we highlight the number of cases across EU member states and 
time, the characteristics of individual infringement cases, and the policy areas (e.g., 
agriculture, environment, trade) of violated European legal acts. 
 
In 2000, the European Commission provided us with all infringement proceedings 
opened by the European Commission between 1978 and 1999 that reached at least 
the Reasoned Opinion stage. We manually coded missing data using the Commis-
sion´s Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law and judgments 
from the European Court of Justice. We did not receive a complete list of those cases 
that were settled before the European Commission issued a Reasoned Opinion as in-
formation on complaints and Formal Letters is considered confidential  (cf. Börzel 
2001). 
 
Infringement proceedings that reached at least the first official stage of the proceed-
ings, i.e., the Reasoned Opinion stage, constitute the more serious infringement cases. 
They concern issues at that could obviously not be solved through informal negotia-
tions between the European Commission and the member state at the two previous 
stages of the proceedings. Following the issue of a Reasoned Opinion, an individual 
infringement case can go through several stages until it initially ends with a ruling by 
the European Court of Justice (see Figure 2). If the member states still refuse to com-
ply, the Commission can open new proceedings that can lead to the ECJ imposing 
financial penalties. Of course, proceedings can be terminated at any stage if the mem-
ber state decides to comply with the European Commission´s demands to implement a 
specific legal act correctly or succeeds at convincing the European Commission that it 
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Figure 2: European Union Infringement Proceedings 
 
It is a commonly held assumption – both among policy makers and academics – that 
the EU is facing a growing compliance problem that is systematic and pathological. The 
negative assessment is backed by the increasing number of infringement proceedings, 
which the European Commission has opened against the member states over the 
years. As we can see in Figure 3, the number of infringement proceedings reaching the 
official stage has indeed increased over time. However, this is not too surprising as the 
number of member states that can violate EU law and the number of European legal 
acts that can be violated has increased as well. 
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There is significant variation in the number of infringement proceedings across member 
states (see Figure 4). The EU 15 member states can be divided into three groups: 
leaders, laggards, and the middle-field. Of the EU 15, the three Scandinavian member 
states, Great Britain, and the Netherlands rarely violate EU law. The southern member 
states (including France) – with the exception of Spain – and Belgium seriously lag 
behind. The rest of the EU 15 constitutes the middle-field. 
 
Figure 4: sum of infringement proceedings by member state 
 
Of course, Figure 4 has to be read with a grain of salt as it includes all EU member 
states independent of their date of accession and the growing body of EU law. Be-
tween 1979 and 1999, the number of EU laws the member states can violate more 
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The country ranking, however, only slightly changes when we control for the length of 
membership and the growing body of EU law. Figure 6 shows the country ranking for a 
relative variable which measures the number of reasoned opinions based on non-
compliance with directives in relation to the number of directives in force in that specific 
year. Since the calculation is done on a year to year basis, the length of membership is 
irrelevant. The reason why we focus on directives rather than the entire body of EU law 
in this relative variable lies in the discrepancy between the share of directive-related 
infringement cases and the share of directives in the European legislative output. More 
the 78 per cent of all infringement cases of the database concern the correct and timely 
legal implementation and practical application of directives. In contrast, in the year 
1999 the number of regulations in force had been nearly 10 times higher than the num-
ber of directives in force. Combining these two types of legislative acts would deflate 
the relative variable and lead to a loss of precision. While the ranking of the member 
states does not change substantially, it is notable that France has most infringement 
proceedings based on treaty articles, regulations and decisions, and, therefore, im-
proves by four positions in the ranking based solely on directives. 
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Figure 6: Annual Reasoned Opinions based on non-compliance with directives in per-
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The distribution across policy sectors also shows significant variation.10
 
 In half of the 
policy sectors, we only find a handful of infringement proceedings. In the sectors inter-
nal market, environment, enterprise, industry, and agriculture, by contrast, member 
states commit large numbers of violate (cf. Figure 7). A more detailed analysis reveals 
that the non-compliance patterns by individual member states across the policy sectors 
are fairly constant, i.e., Italy is the compliance laggard in virtually all policy sectors (ex-
cept for the field of social and employment policy in which Belgium had to face slightly 
more infringements) while the Scandinavian member states, Great Britain, and the 
Netherlands have consistently good compliance records. 
                                               
 
10  See our current project “Policy matters - but why? Explaining non-compliance with European law 
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Figure 7: Percentage of infringement cases by sector in relation to the percentage of 
legal acts by sector 
 
 
In addition to analyzing infringement proceedings across time, member states, and 
policy sectors, our data also allows us to analyze infringement proceedings across the 
type of violation (see Figure 8). The European Commission distinguishes between the 
non- or late notification of the transposition of EU directives, the legal non-conformity of 
national implementation measures implementing an EU directive, the incorrect applica-
tion of national implementation measures (NIM), and the violation of treaty provisions, 
regulations, and decisions. As mentioned above, 57% of all infringement cases fall into 
the first category, i.e., infringement proceedings were opened by the European Com-
mission for a member states failure to report on the transposition of an EU directive into 
national law. The remaining 43% of cases are distributed among the remaining three 
categories (2: 8%, 3: 14%, and 4: 21%). While categories 1-3 are concerned with EU 
directives, our data set also allows us to break the fourth category down into violations 
of treaty provisions, regulations, and decisions. In fact, our data includes information on 
the exact legal act – directive, treaty provision, regulation, or decision – that is at the 





  18 



















1970 1980 1990 20001970 1980 1990 2000
Non-Notification legal non-conformity with directives 









Finally, our data allows us to analyze the duration of infringement proceedings (Figure 
9, cf. Börzel et al. 2012). Not only does our data include information on the number of 
stages that individual infringement proceedings pass through. They also show the date 
of when the proceedings reach a particular stage, such as the Reasoned Opinions, 
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Figure 9: duration of infringement proceedings by member states in days 


















There is also an interesting variation in the duration of infringement proceedings over 
different policy sectors (see Figure 10). It shows how difficult the tax policy harmoniza-
tion can be and it seems that areas of positive integration are more contentious when it 
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Figure 10: duration of infringement proceedings by policy sector in days11












                                               
 
11  TAX: tax policy; E&S: employment and social policy; H&PC: health and consumer protection policy; 
SM: single market policy; ENV: environmental policy; T&E: transport and energy policy; AG: agricul-
ture policy; ENT: enterprise policy. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have made the case for infringement data as a proxy for non-
compliance with EU law. It provided a closer look at what our data set has to offer in 
terms of number of cases, information on these cases, and variation across EU mem-
ber states, policy sectors, time, types of violations, legal acts, duration and stages of 
the infringement proceedings. While compiling such a large data set is one thing, mak-
ing use of it is another. With the help of a project funded by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), we are currently in the process of updating the data.12
 
 
One of the major challenges lying ahead of us and other EU compliance scholars is the 
generation of new theoretical ideas and the finding of ways to test them. While we have 
an extensive and rich data set on compliance as a dependent variable, it is far from 
obvious how we can find and compile data on interesting independent variables that 
can be matched and merged with our data. Depending on the focus of the research, a 




                                               
 
12  Policy matters - but why? Explaining non-compliance with European law across sectors                   
(BO 1831/6-1). 
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